Educational efforts in bioethics are prevalent, but little is known about their efficacy. Although previous work indicates that courses in bioethics have a demonstrable effect on medical students, it has not examined their effect on health care professionals. In this report, we describe a study designed to investigate the effect of bioethics education on health care professionals. At the Intensive Bioethics Course, a six-day course held annually at Georgetown University, we administered a questionnaire requiring open-ended responses to vignettes both before (...) and after the course. Following the course, respondents defended their responses more carefully and articulated their thoughts more clearly. In addition, after the course respondents seemed to have a more subtle understanding of the relevant issues in the cases and applied theory to these cases more frequently. These findings help to formulate an understanding of the effect of bioethics education on health care professionals. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to argue that the relationship between intentions and meaning has been misconstrued by some influential recent theories of meaning. The theories I have in mind derive from earlier work by H. P. Grice, but have undergone extensive development and modification in the hands of Grice himself,, Stephen Schiffer, Jonathan Bennett and others. There have been, during much the same period, developments of Austin’s work on speech acts in which the same Gricean influence is unmistakable; (...) indeed, such influence has affected interpretations of Austin’s work itself, by such writers as Strawson, Searle, and Vendler. (shrink)

For half a century, J. I. Packer's classic has helped Christians everywhere discover the wonder, glory, and joy of knowing God. This fiftieth anniversary edition of a thought-provoking work seeks to renew and enrich our understanding of God, bringing together knowing about God and knowing God through a close relationship with Jesus Christ.

For cardinals $\mathfrak {a}$ and $\mathfrak {b}$, we write $\mathfrak {a}=^\ast \mathfrak {b}$ if there are sets A and B of cardinalities $\mathfrak {a}$ and $\mathfrak {b}$, respectively, such that there are partial surjections from A onto B and from B onto A. $=^\ast $ -equivalence classes are called surjective cardinals. In this article, we show that $\mathsf {ZF}+\mathsf {DC}_\kappa $, where $\kappa $ is a fixed aleph, cannot prove that surjective cardinals form a cardinal algebra, which gives a negative (...) solution to a question proposed by Truss [J. Truss, Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 27, 165–207 (1984)]. Nevertheless, we show that surjective cardinals form a “surjective cardinal algebra”, whose postulates are almost the same as those of a cardinal algebra, except that the refinement postulate is replaced by the finite refinement postulate. This yields a smoother proof of the cancellation law for surjective cardinals, which states that $m\cdot \mathfrak {a}=^\ast m\cdot \mathfrak {b}$ implies $\mathfrak {a}=^\ast \mathfrak {b}$ for all cardinals $\mathfrak {a},\mathfrak {b}$ and all nonzero natural numbers m. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:45. HUME'S DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SELF One of the more baffling and apparently inconclusive parts of the Treatise is the section on personal identity. Hume himself, when he takes a backward glance at it in those notorious passages in the Appendix, singles it out as representing an unresolved problem in his philosophy. It is a matter of fairly general agreement among recent writers on the subject that one of (...) Hume's chief difficulties -- though not one he recognizes — is his assigning to the mind (or, sometimes, the "imagination") certain activities, which he claims are instrumental in generating belief in, and awareness of, the very mind or self whose activities they are said to be. Hume talks about customs and habits of the mind and the expectations arising out of these, of the acts of observing, noticing and associating, of believing, of feigning, and so on, acts which the mind is required to perform in order for us to be able to explain along acceptable empiricist lines how the idea of an abiding self arises. Such talk, it seems, already presupposes the existence of a self and our possession of the idea thereof. So does, of course, the talk involved in Hume's accounts of the external world and of causality. Insofar as these involve his theory of belief, they, too, seem to presuppose a self which is more than a fiction, more than a product of the imagination. Yet the account he gives of the self seems to yield precisely a fiction in just the sense in which our ideas of the external world and of its causal connections are ideas of fictions. Quite generally, then, if Hume's theory of belief presupposes a continually existing self, what sense can be made of his arguments to show that our belief in such a self is the belief in a fiction? I want to argue that Hume can be defended against such criticisms and that the appearance of circularity here is just that: an appearance. It results largely from 46. two features of the Treatise. The first is that since at different points in the Treatise Hume is obviously concerned with different problems, his language reflects this. It is for this reason only that at times he talks in ways which make it seem that a continually existing self is being presupposed. The second feature responsible for the appearance of circularity is that while Hume draws a distinction between "perfect" and 'imperfect" identity, he fails to make that distinction explicit enough, so that one may easily miss the all-important point that it is only the former sort of identity which is being denied of the self, and the latter sort which is being explained and accounted for along Humean empiricist lines. If we keep this in mind, we shall see that the references in his account of the identity of the self to the activities of the self are not questionbegging, and that the attribution of these activities to the very same "fiction" whose existence is being accounted for carries no absurdity. II One way to bring out the differences between the kind of self which is alleged to be presupposed by Hume's account and that which, as I shall argue, is really involved in that account, is to put pressure on Hume's doctrine of 2 association. It is frequently urged by commentators that the notion of association which is so fundamental for much of Hume's philosophy is ambiguous, showing as it does the influence of two very different models, deriving from Hutcheson and Newton respectively. On the first model, a continuing self is presupposed as the agent of the various sorts of associative acts he invokes; on the second it is the items associated (perceptions) which are themselves the entities doing the associating. Clearly, the question whether Hume's theory of belief involves the assumption that a continuing self exists (harmless in the uses of that 47. theory in other contexts, but possibly fatal in its use in a theory of personal identity) may be seen to resolve into the question, which model of association is fundamental for Hume? It is, of course, an undeniable... (shrink)

Ashley and Stack couple their claim that Hume holds a logical-construction theory with the remarkable suggestion that, so understood, his views yield "... at least a recognizable facsimile of the identity most of us believe in." The highly implausible suggestion that the non-philosopher regards his self as a logical construct should be enough to provide a motive for re-examining the arguments Ashley and Stack offer for their interpretation. These arguments make use of the distinction Hume develops between perfect and imperfect (...) identity and lead, first of all, to the conclusion that, contrary to some interpretations, Hume does not refuse the self all identity, but only perfect identity, that is, identity defined as the "idea of an object, that remains invariable and uninterrupted through a supposed variation of time." Finding the self to be not such an object, Hume says it cannot be said to have such identity. It can, however, be said to have imperfect identity, constituted by the "uninterrupted progress of thought" over a succession of objects, namely our perceptions. (shrink)

Experience and reason, it has been claimed, provide the bases of religious belief. The first and fourth groups of selections in Mr. Yandell’s collection of readings probe this claim. In these sections, as in the two intervening ones primary sources are followed by critical analyses and appraisals. Thus, when religious experience is being considered selections from the Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita, Buddhist scriptures, and the Old and New Testaments are followed by commentaries drawn from writers such as William James, Rudolf (...) Otto, and John Baillie. Generally, primary materials are selected from "traditional" thinkers, while analyses are drawn from more contemporary ones. For example, the problem of evil is set by Hume, Leibniz, and Kant, and discussed by J. L. Mackie, Alvin Plantinga, and Dewey Hoitenga. Those authors who are included are readable, and the readings mesh well. (shrink)

1976 will surely prove to have been a vintage year in Hume studies. The excitement generated by the Edinburgh and McGill conferences has been complemented by the publication of commemorative issues by at least three journals and now by the appearance of this rich and rewarding volume. Its nineteen papers, all but four of them newly written, display the variety and excitement of present-day Hume scholarship. Indeed, the dominating impression is that the rich veins of Hume’s writings on psychology, morals, (...) religion, art, politics and history are only just being opened up, dramatically broadening the quite narrow focus of much earlier scholarship. The preoccupation with the narrowly epistemological concerns of Book I of the Treatise and of the first Enquiry has given way to a catholic interest in the various facets and levels of Hume’s thought and particularly in the way in which a study of its other dimensions can help us understand the more well-thumbed portions of his works. (shrink)

My Purpose is twofold: first, to interpret Rousseau's The Social Contract in terms of a serious interpretation of the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality and second, to use as the principal interpretative concept for both, the concept of independence. One gets the impression in reading commentators that the Discourse on Inequality is not taken seriously in its own right but rather is treated as what it is, an essay which was suitable for submission as a prize essay, (...) with the required clever rhetorical style, flashes of paradox and yet withal solemnly addressing itself to a virtually impossible question. However, if it is taken, in part, as Rousseau's social and psychological analysis of modern society, as an account of “men as they are” , then it is not only worthy of serious study in itself, it also helps one to see that still puzzling book, The Social Contract , from a new perspective. Moreover, Rousseau's concept of independence is both interesting and helpful. What Rousseau means by “independence” may diner from what he means by “freedom”, but for most of this essay I shall draw from the latter a working definition of the former and thus shall mean by independence: not being subject to or under the control of another person or persons, and not being subject to or under the control of one's passions. The advantage of attending to the concept of independence is that it enables one to recognize that Rousseau is asserting three seemingly incompatible propositions: first, man is independent, second, no man is independent and in the given circumstances can be and, third, man must become dependent in order to become independent. (shrink)

Several themes can be identified in the commentaries. The first is that the climbing fibers may have more than one function; the second is that the climbing fibers provide sensory rather than motor signals. We accept the possibility that climbing fibers may have more than one function consequence(s)’ in the title. Until we know more about the function of the inhibitory input to the inferior olive from the cerebellar nuclei, which are motor structures, we have to keep open the possibility (...) that the climbing fiber signals can be a combination of sensory and motor signals. (shrink)

The persistence of many contrasting notions of climbing fiber function after years of investigation testifies that the issue of climbing fiber contributions to cerebellar transactions is still unresolved. The proposed capabilities of the climbing fibers cover an impressive spectrum. For many researchers, the climbing fibers signal errors in motor performance, either in the conventional manner of frequency modulation or as a single announcement of an “unexpected event”. More controversial is the effect of these signals on the simple spike modulation of (...) Purkinje cells. In some hands, they lead to a long-term depression of the strength of parallel fiber synapses, while, in other hands, they lead to a short-lasting enhancement of the responsiveness of Purkinje cells to mossy fiber inputs or contribute to the often-seen reciprocal relation between complex and simple spike modulation. For still other investigators, the climbing fibers serve internal timing functions through their capacity for synchronous and rhythmic firing. The above viewpoints are presented in the spirit of trying to reach some consensus about climbing fiber function. Each point of view is introduced by summarizing first the key observations made by the respective proponents; then the issues of short-lasting enhancement, reciprocity between complex and simple spikes, and synchrony and rhythmicity are addressed in the context of the visual climbing fiber system of the vestibulocerebellum. (shrink)

This is an examination of the significance of Gandhi's social philosophy for development. It is argued that, when seen in light of Gandhi's social philosophy, the concepts of appropriate technology and basic needs take on new meaning. The Gandhian approach can be identified with theoriginal "basic needs" strategy for international development. Gandhi's approach helps to provide greater equity, or "distributive justice," by promoting technology that is appropriate to "basic needs". Gandhi's social philosophy has been neglected by most development specialists, with (...) only a few exceptions. This analysis attempts to draw out some aspects of M.K. Gandhi's background and his thinking aboutswadeshi andswaraj. Gandhi's ideas, which emerged out of an "Indic" meta-cultural background, are based on an emphasis on equity. Gandhi's syncretic Indic background includes a belief in what Bateson, writing about Bali, Indonesia, has called the "steady state." Development activities should be carried out in a phased manner that does not disturb the beneficial aspects of dynamic equilibrium, but that does promote "positive development." A.T. is particularly useful within the context of a basic needs approach to international development because use of A.T. is probably more likely to lead to equitable growth. The "economic growth" strategy, utilizing "advanced technology" exclusively, has caused unemployment and has not led to effective "trickle down," much less "high mass consumption." In many developing countries the poorest 20% of the population are worse off in 1990 than they were in 1980. By making use of the "advantage of backwardness" and viewing development in terms of long-term impacts, a basic needs approach using A.T. is more likely to lead to a positive impact on third world food systems than a pure "economic growth" strategy. (shrink)